Naxalism (Left Wing Extremism) - Causes and Solution for UPSC

Left Wing Extremism (Naxalism): Trends, Drivers, and India’s Response

Left Wing Extremism (LWE) once spanned over 200 districts; today, violence is concentrated in a smaller belt across parts of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, and Bihar. The ideology seeks armed overthrow of the state, but the terrain of contest is as much governance and rights as it is security. This note traces trends, why the movement persists, and how India combines force, development, and rights-based measures to reduce its footprint.

Where It Stands Now

• Incidents and fatalities have declined steadily over the past decade; several states (Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Telangana) are effectively free of significant activity.
• Hotspots remain in the tri-junction of Chhattisgarh–Odisha–Maharashtra and some pockets of Jharkhand/Bihar.
• Urban networks supporting propaganda, recruitment, and finances have drawn recent attention (“urban fronts”).

Why It Took Root

• Alienation and land/forest rights gaps: Slow implementation of Forest Rights Act, displacement, and weak service delivery in tribal belts created grievances.
• Governance vacuum: Thin administration, poor roads, and low state presence allowed parallel structures to emerge.
• Local disputes: Exploitation by contractors/middlemen and stalled justice systems fed resentment.

Origin and Ideology in Brief

Naxalbari (1967) in West Bengal sparked the movement; later mergers formed CPI (Maoist) in 2004. The strategy follows “protracted people’s war” with guerrilla tactics and parallel “janatana sarkars” in forest belts. While ideology is Maoist, recruits often join out of grievance, coercion, or lack of alternatives.

Geography of Decline and Persistence

• “LWE-affected” and “Most Affected” district lists have shrunk sharply; many states are now incident-free.
• Core pockets persist in Bastar (Chhattisgarh) and adjoining Odisha/Maharashtra; some presence in parts of Jharkhand/Bihar.
• Southern corridor (AP/Telangana/Karnataka/TN) has largely been dismantled; West Bengal saw sharp decline.

Government Strategy: Security + Development + Rights

India’s approach blends targeted operations with governance fixes. Key elements:

• Security push: Central Armed Police Forces (CRPF, CoBRA), specialised state units (Greyhounds in the south, C-60 in Maharashtra), fortified police stations, better mobility, and training.
• Unified command and intelligence: Multi-agency coordination, air support, tech (drones, satcom), and improved HUMINT; SAMADHAN framework stresses leadership, actionable intel, and tech.
• Development surge: Road Connectivity Project for LWE areas, mobile towers, banking/DBT reach, Eklavya schools, health sub-centres, and livelihood programs to raise the cost of insurgency and address root causes.
• Rights and inclusion: Faster FRA/land title settlement, fair mining and rehabilitation norms, and grievance redress to reduce exploitation narratives.
• Surrender/rehabilitation: State schemes offer financial aid, training, and housing for surrendering cadres; success depends on credibility and protection.

Development and Governance Levers

• Special Central Assistance/SRE: Funds for critical infrastructure, education, skilling, and police equipment in LWE districts.
• Aspirational Districts overlap: Health, education, sanitation, and income indicators tracked closely; convergence of schemes for quick wins.
• Livelihoods: NTFP value addition, SHGs, MGNREGA works, and market linkages reduce dependency on levy systems.
• Connectivity: Telecom tower rollouts and rural banking/DBT access cut isolation and cash handling vulnerabilities.

Operating Patterns and Tactics

• Ambushes/IEDs on patrols; attempts to seize weapons; targeting of informants and local representatives.
• Use of difficult terrain and local knowledge; small-unit actions to avoid decisive engagements.
• Cadre strength reportedly declining; recruitment focuses on youth in remote tribal belts, sometimes under duress.

Lessons from Success Stories

• Greyhounds model: Light, jungle-hardened units with good intel broke the backbone in undivided Andhra; similar agility helps elsewhere.
• Telangana/West Bengal: Strong operations plus quick development and political outreach reduced space for cadres.
• Community trust: Regular camps (Jan Sunvai/medical), local recruitment into police, and quick project delivery improved perception in several districts.

Financing, Logistics, and Urban Support

• Funds from extortion/levy on contractors, illegal mining/forest produce, and occasional external channels.
• Urban overground networks provide funds, propaganda, legal aid; law enforcement targets these under UAPA/other laws with due process to avoid overreach.
• Choking finance includes monitoring cash/transfer channels, regulating mining/contracting, and community vigilance on levies.
• Mining and contracting transparency (e-tendering, social audits) reduce rent-seeking and levy opportunities.

Technology and Infrastructure

• Drones, GPS, and thermal devices aid patrols and camp surveillance.
• Roads, bridges, and telecom change operational dynamics—faster casualty evacuation and logistics reduce force vulnerability and improve civilian services.
• Hotline/telecom presence cuts Maoist information advantage and connects villages to the state.
• Modernisation of police (weaponry, comms, protective gear, vehicles) under central schemes increases survivability and reach.

Law and Human Rights Safeguards

Operations run under CrPC/IPC/UAPA and state police laws. Courts and NHRC stress that counter-LWE actions must respect rights; excesses fuel recruitment. Training on lawful conduct, accountability, and fair investigations is part of the long-term solution.

Risks and Emerging Challenges

• Residual pockets could harden if development lags or rights violations rise.
• Potential linkages with other extremist/organised crime networks (arms, narcotics) need monitoring.
• Urban radicalisation and online propaganda can sustain recruitment if not addressed with counter-narratives and fair policing.

Metrics to Watch

• Districts classified as LWE-affected; number and severity of incidents/fatalities.
• Road/telecom/health/education coverage in former “no-go” areas; FRA title issuance pace.
• Surrender and rehabilitation numbers vs fresh recruitment indicators.
• Prosecution quality: convictions vs arrests; allegations of excesses and redress action.

Timeline Snapshot

• 1967: Naxalbari uprising.
• 2004: CPI (Maoist) formed; violence spikes mid-2000s.
• 2009–2010: Major operations; Supreme Court strikes down Salwa Judum, stressing state-led lawful action.
• 2017: SAMADHAN articulated to improve leadership, intel, tech, and choke finance.
• 2020s: Affected districts and fatalities decline; focus on core Bastar belt and remaining leadership.

Takeaway: LWE declines when sustained security operations meet credible, rights-respecting governance. Roads, telecom, health, education, and fair land/forest rights shrink the support base; precise intel-led action and finance disruption prevent regrouping. Legitimacy of the state—not just force—decides whether remaining pockets fade or resurge.