India-Middle East Relations - Gulf Countries, Israel, Iran, and Energy Security

India-Middle East Relations - Gulf Countries, Israel, Iran, and Energy Security

For India, the Middle East (West Asia) is not a distant region—it is a daily national-interest theatre. India's energy basket, maritime trade routes, diaspora welfare, counter-terrorism concerns, investment flows, and new connectivity corridors all converge here. The region connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean through critical chokepoints (Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez), and political shocks in West Asia quickly translate into oil-price volatility, shipping disruption, evacuation needs, and strategic balancing challenges for India.

1. Overview of India's Middle East Policy

Strategic significance stems from five overlapping realities: (1) India's high import dependence for crude oil and rising gas demand; (2) a very large Indian diaspora concentrated in GCC states; (3) West Asia's role as India's extended neighbourhood and a key space for maritime security; (4) expanding trade, investments, and technology partnerships (especially with UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel); and (5) the emergence of minilateral platforms (I2U2) and connectivity corridors (IMEC), alongside traditional constraints like sanctions and conflict dynamics.

Core pillars of India's approach can be understood as: Energy + Diaspora + Security + Trade/Investment + Connectivity/Technology. In practice, India aims to: diversify suppliers and shipping routes; deepen economic ties without taking sides in intra-regional rivalries; cooperate on counter-terrorism and maritime security; protect workers abroad; and leverage new regional openings created by shifting alignments.

Policy style for UPSC: India's Middle East policy is best seen through the lens of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment—building deeper ties with Israel and the Gulf while sustaining functional engagement with Iran, and maintaining principled support for a two-state solution even as bilateral cooperation with Israel grows.

Prelims Angle

• Locate key chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez Canal; understand their link to India's trade and energy flows.
• Remember bloc and platforms: GCC members, I2U2, IMEC, INSTC.
• Track "facts-to-memorise": major agreements (CEPA), dates of key MoUs, major evacuation operations, and headline energy deals.

Mains Angle

• Write answers using pillars + constraints + outcomes: (energy, diaspora, security, trade, connectivity) vs (conflict, sanctions, great-power competition).
• Show balancing: Israel ties + Gulf ties + Iran connectivity + Palestine position.
• Link GS2 (IR, diaspora, security) with GS3 (energy security, logistics, supply-chain resilience).

2. India–Gulf Countries Relations (GCC focus) and Key Bilateral Partnerships

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain—forms the backbone of India's West Asia engagement. It combines (a) India's largest concentration of overseas citizens, (b) major energy suppliers, (c) high-value trade/investment opportunities, and (d) security cooperation in the Arabian Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Indian missions estimate about 8.9 million Indians live in GCC states, making the Gulf the single most important regional cluster for India's diaspora diplomacy.

2.1 India–UAE: CEPA-led economic deepening + strategic convergence

India–UAE relations have moved from transactional trade to a broad strategic partnership anchored in trade facilitation, investments, fintech, energy, and defence. The India–UAE CEPA was signed on 18 February 2022 and entered into force on 1 May 2022, accelerating bilateral trade and institutionalising cooperation across goods, services, and new areas.

Financial connectivity is a major new driver: a framework MoU to promote local currency (INR–AED) settlement was witnessed on 15 July 2023. In February 2024, both sides welcomed interlinking of the national payment platforms UPI (India) and AANI (UAE) to enable seamless cross-border transactions.

People-to-people and soft power also matter for UPSC narratives: the BAPS Hindu Mandir in Abu Dhabi was inaugurated on 14 February 2024, reflecting deeper societal acceptance and cultural diplomacy.

January 2026 update: On 19 January 2026, India and the UAE announced a push to raise bilateral trade to US$ 200 billion by 2032. They also finalised a long-term LNG arrangement: UAE's ADNOC Gas to supply 0.5 million metric tonnes per year to India's HPCL for 10 years (reported value around US$ 3 billion), along with a letter of intent on a strategic defence partnership.

2.2 India–Saudi Arabia: Strategic Partnership Council (SPC) + energy-investment synergy

Saudi Arabia is central to India's energy security and investment strategy. The Strategic Partnership Council (SPC) was established during PM Modi's visit to Riyadh on 28–29 October 2019, creating a high-level mechanism to steer cooperation across political-security and economy-investment tracks.

The relationship broadened after the G20 period: India and Saudi leaders co-chaired the first SPC meeting during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to New Delhi in September 2023, highlighting energy security, investments, defence, and emerging technologies.

2.3 India–Qatar: LNG anchor + trade expansion + crisis diplomacy

Qatar remains India's most consequential partner for LNG supply. In energy, a major milestone was the 20-year LNG purchase contract executed by Petronet LNG with QatarEnergy on 6 February 2024 for 7.5 million tonnes per annum, beginning 2028 through 2048.

In politics and consular diplomacy, Qatar released eight former Indian Navy personnel on 12 February 2024, a significant example of high-stakes bilateral crisis management.

In trade, India–Qatar bilateral trade stood at about US$ 14.08 billion in 2023–24 (PIB), and both countries later signalled ambitions to double trade to US$ 28 billion over five years, along with discussions on a possible trade agreement.

2.4 India–Oman: Maritime strategy (Duqm) + December 2025 trade pact

Oman is strategically placed near the Strait of Hormuz and is important for India's western Indian Ocean posture. An annexure related to Duqm port was signed during the PM's Oman visit on 11–12 February 2018, enabling Indian naval ships to extend operations (including anti-piracy) for longer durations.

December 2025 update: India signed an economic partnership agreement with Oman on 18 December 2025. Reuters reported that Oman would provide zero-duty access on over 98% of its tariff lines, while India would reduce tariffs on about 78% of its tariff lines, marking a major upgrade in India–Oman economic ties.

2.5 India–Kuwait and India–Bahrain: diaspora-heavy ties + steady economic engagement

Kuwait is important for energy supplies and a very large Indian workforce. MEA briefs note that Indians in Kuwait are approximately 1 million, the largest expatriate community there.

Bahrain is smaller but strategically located and financially connected. PM Modi's visit on 24–25 August 2019 was the first-ever by an Indian PM, upgrading visibility and institutional ties.

Prelims Angle

• GCC members and capitals; identify which are major LNG vs crude suppliers.
• Memorise key dates: UAE CEPA (in force 1 May 2022), Qatar LNG deal (6 Feb 2024), Oman trade pact (18 Dec 2025), UAE LNG deal (19 Jan 2026).
• Know Duqm (Oman) and why it matters for anti-piracy and logistics.

Mains Angle

• Show how Gulf ties moved from "oil + remittances" to technology + investments + connectivity.
• Use UAE–Saudi–Qatar differences: economic models, energy profile, geopolitical preferences, and implications for India.
• Write diaspora as a strategic asset but also a vulnerability during crises (evacuation operations, labour disputes).

3. India–Israel Relations: Defence, Technology, Agriculture, and the Palestine Balance

India's relationship with Israel has expanded from quiet functional cooperation to a visible, multi-sector partnership. India officially recognised Israel in 1950, but full diplomatic relations were established on 29 January 1992. Contemporary cooperation is concentrated in defence and security technology, innovation ecosystems, water and agriculture (including Centres of Excellence), and high-tech and start-up linkages.

Defence and security remain a major pillar: Israel is a critical partner for advanced systems such as air defence, UAVs, precision munitions, and sensors, improving India's operational readiness. For UPSC answers, focus on the theme: technology transfer + co-development + rapid induction (rather than listing platforms without context).

Economic and technology ties: The bilateral trade (excluding defence) was reported at US$ 6.53 billion in FY 2023–24 by the Indian Embassy in Israel, indicating a strong base beyond security.

Balancing Palestine: India maintains a calibrated position—supporting Israel's security while reiterating support for a two-state solution and humanitarian assistance for Palestinian civilians during conflict escalations. In Mains, the scoring approach is to show India's ability to separate bilateral partnerships from regional conflict stances, consistent with strategic autonomy.

Prelims Angle

• Remember: full diplomatic relations India–Israel since 1992.
• Track terms in news: two-state solution, Golan Heights, Israel–Gaza conflict, defence exports.
• Know broad sectors: defence, water-tech, agri-tech, innovation funds.

Mains Angle

• Use the 4-part structure: Drivers (security, tech), Enablers (innovation ecosystems), Constraints (regional conflicts), India's balancing (Palestine position + humanitarian approach).
• Link Israel ties to India's domestic priorities: food security (agri-tech), water efficiency, defence indigenisation.

4. India–Iran Relations: Chabahar, INSTC, JCPOA, and Sanctions Management

Iran is central to India's connectivity strategy to Afghanistan and Central Asia and remains relevant to energy and regional stability. India's Iran policy is shaped by three constants: (1) geography—access routes bypassing Pakistan, (2) geopolitics—U.S. sanctions constraints, and (3) regional security—spillovers from West Asian conflicts.

Chabahar Port is the flagship: MEA notes that India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) signed a ten-year contract on 13 May 2024 with Iran's Ports and Maritime Organisation to equip and operate the Shahid Beheshti Terminal. This is UPSC-relevant as it demonstrates India's long-term commitment to a western connectivity node while navigating sanctions risk.

Sanctions and waiver dynamics (October 2025): On 30 October 2025, India stated it was granted a six-month exemption from U.S. sanctions applicable to Chabahar operations—an important example of diplomatic negotiation to preserve India's connectivity interests.

INSTC (International North–South Transport Corridor) complements Chabahar by creating a multimodal route linking India to Eurasia via Iran, improving resilience against disruptions in traditional routes. For Mains, connect INSTC with supply-chain diversification and trade geography.

JCPOA context: The U.S. withdrawal (2018) and subsequent uncertainty impacted India's energy and project calculations. For UPSC, the key is not the treaty text, but India's policy challenge: how to sustain strategic projects and trade under sanctions while maintaining major power partnerships.

Prelims Angle

• Chabahar location: Gulf of Oman; strategic purpose: access to Afghanistan/Central Asia.
• Key date: 13 May 2024 ten-year Chabahar contract.
• Know "sanctions exemption" and why it matters for connectivity projects (Oct 2025).

Mains Angle

• Frame Iran ties as a case study in strategic autonomy under constraints.
• Link Chabahar + INSTC to India's Central Asia policy and regional connectivity.
• Discuss sanctions impact on energy options, banking channels, and project timelines.

5. Energy Security: Oil Dependence, LNG from Qatar, SPRs, and Maritime Risk

Energy is the single largest material driver of India's Middle East engagement. India's oil import dependency has been around the high-80% range in recent years: 87.8% in FY 2023–24, rising to about 88.4% in April–September 2025–26 (reported). This means disruptions in West Asia translate quickly into domestic inflation, fiscal pressure, and current account risks.

LNG and gas security is increasingly important for India's transition and industrial demand. Qatar is India's dominant LNG supplier: India imported 9.82 million tonnes of LNG from Qatar in January–November 2024, accounting for 38.8% of India's LNG imports by volume (and 41.2% by value). The 7.5 MTPA QatarEnergy–Petronet long-term contract from 2028 to 2048 locks a major future supply line.

Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR): India has SPR facilities totalling 5.33 million metric tonnes at Visakhapatnam (1.33), Mangaluru (1.5), and Padur (2.5). Additional capacity of 6.5 MMT has been approved at Chandikhol (4 MMT) and an expansion at Padur (2.5 MMT). Reuters reported India's broader storage (including company stocks and in-transit) covers about 75 days of demand, with an aim to reach 90 days—also linked to India's aspiration to join the International Energy Agency (IEA).

Maritime risk is the strategic glue between energy and security. West Asian conflicts can spill into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, affecting shipping, insurance costs, and delivery times. For UPSC, always connect energy security with maritime domain awareness, naval deployments, and diversification of routes.

Prelims Angle

• Remember the three Phase-I SPR locations and capacities.
• Qatar's LNG share and the 2028–2048 long-term contract.
• Map the chokepoints and connect them to oil/LNG supply routes.

Mains Angle

• Energy security = availability + affordability + sustainability + resilience; use this as your answer skeleton.
• Discuss de-risking: diversification of suppliers, long-term LNG contracts, SPR expansion, renewables and green hydrogen.
• Bring in geopolitics: conflicts, sanctions, shipping disruptions, and India's evacuation operations as indicators of volatility.

6. Indian Diaspora in the Gulf: Scale, Remittances, and Labour Welfare

The Indian diaspora is both an economic asset and a policy responsibility. The GCC hosts about 8.9 million Indians. Country-wise, official mission pages note approximately 4.3 million Indians in the UAE (2024), about 2.7 million in Saudi Arabia (updated January 2026), about 830,000 in Qatar, and around 675,000 in Oman. Such concentrations make West Asia the primary theatre for India's consular capacity and labour diplomacy.

Remittances have remained a macroeconomic stabiliser. RBI-reported trends note inward remittances of about US$ 118.7 billion in 2023–24, with the UAE contributing 19.2% as the second-largest source after the U.S. World Bank analysis also highlights the global scale of remittances to LMICs in 2024, reinforcing why labour markets and migration policy remain strategically important.

Labour welfare issues that frequently appear in UPSC include recruitment malpractices, contract substitution, wage disputes, workplace safety, and legal aid. India's approach relies on (a) bilateral labour/manpower mechanisms (e.g., JWGs), (b) digital grievance platforms, (c) community welfare funds, and (d) crisis-time evacuations. West Asia volatility makes evacuation readiness a recurring governance challenge.

Evacuation diplomacy (June 2025): India launched Operation Sindhu on 18 June 2025 to evacuate nationals from conflict zones in Iran and Israel. By 27 June 2025, MEA reported continued operations and coordination with multiple regional governments to ensure safety and movement of nationals.

Prelims Angle

• Remember GCC Indian diaspora scale (~8.9 million) and country-wise clusters (UAE, Saudi, Qatar, Oman).
• Remittance fact: ~US$118.7 bn in 2023–24; UAE share 19.2%.
• Operation Sindhu (June 2025): link to evacuation and crisis management.

Mains Angle

• Write diaspora as: economic contribution (remittances) + soft power bridge + vulnerability (crises, labour exploitation).
• Include policy tools: emigration management, welfare funds, bilateral labour MoUs, skill upgradation, legal aid.
• Use evacuation operations as evidence of state capacity and external risk exposure.

7. IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor): Connectivity, Trade, and Strategic Signalling

IMEC is a major connectivity initiative announced at the G20 (New Delhi) to link India to Europe through West Asia via ports, rail, and digital/energy links. An MoU on IMEC was signed on 9 September 2023 by India, USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE, the EU, Italy, France, and Germany. The strategic significance for India is threefold: (1) de-risking supply chains and logistics routes, (2) deeper integration with Gulf economies and European markets, and (3) geopolitical signalling as a high-standard connectivity alternative.

Conflict sensitivity is also a key UPSC discussion point. IMEC's pace is influenced by regional instability and maritime disruptions in the Red Sea. Yet India has signalled continued engagement; public remarks in late 2024 indicated progress particularly on the "eastern side" involving India, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

How to write IMEC in Mains: treat it as a "corridor of corridors"—logistics + energy + data connectivity—aligned with India's goals of becoming a manufacturing and trade hub, while deepening partnerships with Gulf economies and Europe.

Prelims Angle

• Memorise IMEC signatories and date (9 Sept 2023).
• Know the basic idea: India–Gulf–Europe multimodal corridor (sea + rail), plus digital/energy elements.
• Connect IMEC with G20, PGII/Global Gateway narratives and "connectivity diplomacy".

Mains Angle

• Discuss IMEC as: economic integration + strategic connectivity + de-risking from disruptions.
• Evaluate challenges: conflict spillovers, financing, standardisation, politics of transit states.
• Link IMEC to India's "ports, logistics, manufacturing competitiveness" agenda and energy transition (future hydrogen corridors).

8. I2U2 Grouping (India–Israel–UAE–US): New Minilateral for Technology, Food, Energy

I2U2 reflects the rise of flexible "minilateral" cooperation focused on deliverables rather than formal alliances. The first leaders' meeting took place on 14 July 2022, with a joint statement outlining cooperation in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. A signature project discussed includes a hybrid renewable energy initiative in India (Gujarat), illustrating the group's economic-tech orientation.

Why it matters for India: I2U2 creates a platform where India can leverage (a) Israel's high-end tech, (b) UAE's capital and logistics reach, and (c) U.S. financial/innovation ecosystems—without being locked into a security alliance format. It also complements IMEC's geo-economic logic by strengthening India's ties with UAE and Israel in a region undergoing strategic realignments.

Prelims Angle

• Members: India, Israel, UAE, USA; first leaders' meeting: 14 July 2022.
• Focus areas: food security, energy, water, tech, space.
• Differentiate: I2U2 is primarily geo-economic/tech (unlike security-heavy groupings).

Mains Angle

• Explain minilateralism: smaller groups, faster outcomes, issue-based cooperation.
• Assess how I2U2 supports India's goals: investment + technology + supply-chain resilience.
• Discuss limits: regional conflict, domestic politics of partners, and continuity of projects.

9. Abraham Accords Impact: Regional Normalisation and India's Strategic Space

The Abraham Accords (2020) normalised relations between Israel and key Arab states (notably UAE and Bahrain), altering the regional political economy. For India, the biggest impact is the creation of a more permissive environment for triangular and minilateral cooperation involving Israel and Gulf partners—visible in initiatives like I2U2 and the strategic imagination behind connectivity corridors like IMEC.

Opportunities for India include: (1) integrated supply chains linking Indian manufacturing/food production with Gulf logistics and Israeli tech; (2) expanded defence-tech and dual-use cooperation without forcing binary choices; and (3) stronger people-to-people links via travel, education, and innovation networks. Constraints remain significant: the Israel–Palestine conflict and wider regional tensions can slow economic normalisation and raise political costs for partners.

Prelims Angle

• Know what Abraham Accords are and which states are associated (UAE, Bahrain among first movers).
• Connect Abraham Accords to the rise of new minilaterals and corridors in West Asia.

Mains Angle

• Analyse "normalisation dividends" vs "conflict drag" for economic corridors and minilaterals.
• Explain how India benefits without taking sides: geo-economics, tech, and connectivity.
• Highlight India's consistent Palestine position as part of balancing strategy.

10. Challenges and Way Forward for India in the Middle East

Key challenges for India are structural and recurring:

• Geopolitical volatility: wars and regional rivalries disrupt shipping, raise energy prices, and trigger evacuation needs.
• Sanctions and compliance risk: Iran-related projects require constant diplomatic management (waivers, banking channels, insurance).
• Maritime insecurity: chokepoint disruptions increase freight/insurance costs and test naval readiness.
• Diaspora vulnerabilities: labour exploitation, deportations/visa compliance issues, and crisis-time safety concerns.
• Balancing dilemmas: deepening Israel ties while maintaining Gulf partnerships and support for Palestine; sustaining Iran connectivity without harming major power relationships.

Way forward (exam-ready points):

• Energy resilience: deepen long-term LNG contracts, diversify crude suppliers, expand SPR capacity, and accelerate clean-energy transition to reduce exposure.
• Connectivity + trade: operationalise IMEC components where feasible; strengthen INSTC usage; expand FTAs/CEPAs (UAE, Oman) to anchor economic ties.
• Maritime security: enhance presence in the western Indian Ocean, improve intelligence sharing, and build logistics agreements (Duqm-type access).
• Diaspora-first diplomacy: strengthen recruitment governance, legal aid, welfare funds, and rapid evacuation protocols (Operation Sindhu as a model).
• Strategic balancing: maintain principled positions on conflicts while keeping bilateral cooperation insulated; communicate India's approach as stability-oriented and development-focused.

Prelims Angle

• Revise: sanctions exemption (Chabahar), Operation Sindhu, SPR locations, Qatar LNG share, IMEC signatories.
• Practise map-based recall of ports (Chabahar, Duqm) and chokepoints.

Mains Angle

• Use multi-layered answers: interests (energy/diaspora/security/trade) + instruments (CEPA/IMEC/I2U2/SPR) + constraints (conflict/sanctions) + way forward.
• Bring examples with dates (May 2024 Chabahar contract; Dec 2025 Oman pact; Jan 2026 UAE LNG deal) to show "recent developments".

11. Key Agreements and Milestones Timeline (UPSC Table)

UPSC PYQs and Practice

Prelims Practice (MCQs)

1. With reference to I2U2, consider the following statements:
   • A) It is a grouping of India, Israel, UAE, and the United States.
   • B) Its declared focus areas include food security, energy, and technology partnerships.
   • C) It is a formal military alliance with collective defence obligations.

   Which of the statements given above are correct?

   • (a) A and B only
   • (b) B and C only
   • (c) A and C only
   • (d) A, B and C

   Answer: (a) A and B only.

2. IMEC MoU (September 2023) was signed by India along with which of the following?
   • (a) USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE, EU, Italy, France, Germany
   • (b) Russia, Iran, UAE, EU, China, France, Germany
   • (c) USA, Israel, Egypt, EU, UK, France, Germany
   • (d) Japan, Australia, UAE, EU, Italy, France, Germany

   Answer: (a) USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE, EU, Italy, France, Germany.

3. Which of the following are India's Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) locations in Phase-I?
   • (a) Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur
   • (b) Kandla, Kochi, Paradip
   • (c) Chennai, Mumbai, Kakinada
   • (d) Jamnagar, Haldia, Tuticorin

   Answer: (a) Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur.

4. Qatar's relevance to India's energy security is best explained by which one of the following?
   • (a) Qatar is India's largest supplier of uranium fuel
   • (b) Qatar supplies a dominant share of India's LNG imports and has long-term contracts extending to 2048
   • (c) Qatar is India's main supplier of coal for power generation
   • (d) Qatar is India's biggest exporter of refined petrol

   Answer: (b).

5. With reference to India–Iran relations, Chabahar Port is important because it:
   • (a) Provides India direct land access to Europe through Pakistan
   • (b) Enables connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan
   • (c) Is India's only naval base in West Asia
   • (d) Is the headquarters of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

   Answer: (b).